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Francis: Reciprocity and Environmental Obligations

RECIPROCITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
OBLIGATIONS
Leslie P. Francis*

I. INTRODUCTION

Reciprocity-put most generally-is the idea of actions-in-return
that are not founded in voluntary agreements or contracts. Understood in
this way, reciprocity can be one-on-one: the return of a kindness or the
exchange of presents. But it need not be: pitching in to do one's share of
cooking for a potluck supper, cleaning up the local park, or contributing
to the local public radio station. Here, the idea of reciprocity is doing
one's part to produce a common good, when-and especially becauseothers are doing theirs.1 The moral contribution of reciprocity in such
cases is that pitching in rests not only on the idea of fair shares coupled
with the recognition that the desired outcome will not be produced if too
many fail to contribute, but also on the fact that others are doing their
part. Free riders fail to do their fair shares, but this is not the full moral
story. In addition, free riders let others down by failing to respond in
return to the good efforts that others are making.
Reciprocity in this sense has played a major role in contemporary
bioethics discussions of pandemic planning. The most influential
statement of the ethics of pandemic planning takes reciprocity to be a
fundamental value, requiring that "society support those who face a
disproportionate burden in protecting the public good.",2 Echoing the

* Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, Alfred C. Emery Professor of Law,
University of Utah.
1. For an insightful discussion of reciprocity in these senses, see LAWRENCE C. BECKER,
RECIPROCITY 81-83 (1986).
2. PANDEMIC INFLUENZA WORKING GROUP, UNIV. OF TORONTO JOINT CTR. FOR BIOETHICS,
STAND ON GUARD FOR THEE: ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PREPAREDNESS PLANNING FOR

PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 7 (2005),
documents/upshurstand_guard.pdf.

available at http://www.jointcentreforbioethics.ca/people/
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Canadian national anthem,3 the reciprocity of Stand on Guardfor Thee
includes not only compensation and protection for health care workers
who take significant risks, as well as their families, but also
responsiveness to people who are quarantined or otherwise limited in
their activities in order to protect others.4 In addition, Stand on Guard
for Thee recommends extensive, open, and transparent public discussion
of both priorities and their implementation. 5
In environmental ethics, however, reciprocity seems not to have
surfaced as a value to quite the same extent as in pandemic planning.6
Perhaps the explanation is that it seems very difficult to apply the idea of
actions-in-return to problems that implicate future generations who will
not be able, except figuratively, to respond in kind to present
generations. 7 Or perhaps the explanation is that, by some at least,
reciprocity has been viewed in the narrow economic terms of bargaining
for mutual advantage. 8 Or perhaps reciprocity has been thought of as
limited to compensation for harm, a paradigm drawn from tort that
seems inadequate to account for the obligations of ordinary individuals
in the face of global climate change. 9 This discussion aims to show that
such myopia is misguided and to take some steps to reclaim reciprocity
for environmental ethics.
Over twenty years ago, Lawrence Becker developed a rich account
of reciprocity in virtue-theoretic terms.10 Reciprocity, in Becker's view,
is a complex of dispositions, among them to return good for good, and to
do so in fitting and proportional ways. II Several features of Becker's
view are particularly noteworthy. First, we should think of reciprocity in
terms of traits of character to be cultivated, not as a set of principles to
3. See Robert Stanley Weir, 0 Canada(1908), available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/pgm/ceemcced/symbl/anthem-eng.cfm.
4. PANDEMIC INFLUENZA WORKING GROUP, supra note 2, at 11, 13-15.
5. Id. at 16.
6. There are exceptions. See, e.g., Edward A. Page, Fairnesson the Day After Tomorrow:
Justice, Reciprocity and Global Climate Change, 55 POL. STUD. 225, 233 (2007) (arguing for

intergenerational environmental stewardship, under which present generations have obligations in
reciprocity to both the past and the future).
7. See, e.g., Stephen M. Gardiner, The Real Tragedy of the Commons, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
387, 403-04 (2002).

8. For a recent criticism of this view, see Jonathan Quong, Contractualism,Reciprocity,and
EgalitarianJustice,6 POL., PHIL. & ECON. 75, 89-90 (2007).
9. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensationfor Victims of Climate Change, 155 U.

PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 1605, 1618-21 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.comissues/pdfs/1556/Farber.pdf.
10. BECKER, supra note 1, at 49, 74.

11. Id. at 89-92.
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be applied in mechanical fashion-although the traits of character are
12
dispositions to act in ways that are guided by principled commitments.
Second, we should not think of reciprocity in terms of mutual
advantage; 13 Becker thus detaches reciprocity from the bargaining
paradigms employed in some versions of social contract theory. 4 Third,
reciprocity is not limited to one-on-one exchanges, but instead requires
us to consider what responses are fitting, and how they ought to be
directed. 15 Thus, on Becker's view, the virtue of reciprocity can be
directed both to those in the present and to those in the future. Fourth,
and most crucially for the argument here, reciprocity requires supportive
social structures in order to flourish; in designing legal institutions, 16 for
example, we should consider whether they are likely to undermine
reciprocity or to foster its flourishing-within families, social groups, or
society more generally.
There is, of course, a great deal more to say about how to
understand reciprocity as a virtue. This discussion begins with two
relatively minimalistic reciprocity guidelines. In several quite important
respects, however, our institutions quite likely undermine dispositions to
behave in accord with these guidelines. On this basis, I-hopefully not
in the spirit of Jonathan Swift--develop a modest proposal or two about
how to realign social structures in the United States to foster individual
virtues of reciprocity in the context of environmental ethics.
II. RECIPROCITY

GUIDELINES

In this section, I sketch two more specific reciprocity guidelines
together with some examples of how in the United States today we fail
to meet them. Although I will not defend these guidelines here, 17 I
believe that they are relatively minimal, especially the first one. They are

12. Id. at 45-46, 49, 74.
13. Id. at 230.
14. The idea of justice as an actual bargain for mutual advantage is developed in DAVID
GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 145 (1986). Philosopher John Rawls conceptualized justice as
the first virtue of social institutions designed to share the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 231, 232 (rev. ed. 1999). Whether Rawls-and social contract
theory, more generally-is thus subject to the objection of limiting obligations of justice to those
who can fully cooperate has been the subject of much critical discussion. See, e.g., MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 93 (2006).

15. BECKER, supra note 1, at 93.
16. Id. at 85-86.
17. 1 have defended them elsewhere. See Leslie Pickering Francis, Global Systemic
Problems and InterconnectedDuties, 25 ENVTL. ETHICS 115, 125-28 (2003).
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deliberately open-ended, requiring dispositions about how to think rather
than an exact commitment such as a duty to reduce your carbon footprint
by twenty percent. Here they are:
ONE. If you expect others to incur significant costs in order to
further environmental goals that you favor, you have a duty to reconsider
aspects of your own behavior that might be undermining those very
preservation goals and to identify achievable steps that you might take in
amelioration.' 8 In other words: Don't undo unto others as you wouldn't
have them undo unto you. Call this the "un-golden rule."
TWO. If you expect others to incur significant costs in order to
further environmental goals that you favor, you should consider whether
the expectations you have of them are fair in comparison to the
expectations you have of yourself, and try to identify at least some costs
that you believe would be fair for you yourself to incur.1 9 Call this
"pitching in."
There are many examples of how we, in the United States, currently
fail with respect to the un-golden rule. Consider national treasures
which, as a matter of federal policy, we seek to preserve. For example,
the Everglades are at present the subject of a Comprehensive Everglades
Restoration Plan, enacted by Congress in 2000.20 The Plan includes a
fifty percent contribution by the state for restoration efforts and attempts
to mitigate the expected effects of restoration on minority communities
in the area. 21 Yet it remains highly possible that restoration of the
Everglades will largely fail if global climate change continues. 2
Moreover, subsequent efforts to buy out sugar producers in the
Everglades area have been criticized both as sweetheart deals and for
23
failing to take into account the economic impacts on area communities.
Yet little national attention has been devoted to the extent to which

18. Id. at 125-26.
19. Id. at 127-28.
20. See generally S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST. & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS
JACKSONVILLE DIST., ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC EQUITY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT PLAN:
available
at
EVERGLADES
RESTORATION
PLAN
(2001),
COMPREHENSIVE
http://www.evergladesplan.org/pm/pm-docs/eee/eeesept_ 7.pdf (detailing the social and economic

framework behind the restoration effort).
21. See id. at 5, 7-8.
22. S. FLA. INFO. ACCESS, UNDERSTANDING AND PREDICTING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
IMPACTS ON THE VEGETATION AND FAUNA OF MANGROVE FORESTED ECOSYSTEMS IN FLORIDA 3
(2004),
available at http://sofia.usgs.gov/publications/reports/gcc-final/Understandingand_
Predicting_GCCinENPFINAL_REPORT.pdf.
23. $1.3B U.S. Sugar Buyout Approved Amid Skepticism of Everglades Deal, ORLANDO

SENTINEL, Dec. 17, 2008, at B4.
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agricultural subsidies continue to encourage sugar production in the
Everglades region-activity that is counterproductive to Everglades
restoration. 24
To take another example, Lake Tahoe is the subject of development
controls implemented to maintain the clarity of its waters," yet South
Lake Tahoe continues to advertise itself with apparent success as a place
for tourists to come and play.26 Or another example: The creation of the
Grand Staircase of the Escalante National Monument remains
controversial in southern Utah, while the Intermountain Power Plant in
nearby Millard County continues to supply forty-five percent of its
power to Los Angeles and to impact visibility across the area of the
Grand Staircase. 7 To be fair, in 2005 the City of Los Angeles withdrew
support for a proposed power plant expansion and is devoting the
funding instead to pursuing alternative energy sources-but Los Angeles
continues to get about half of its power from dirty plants in Nevada,
Arizona, and Utah.28
Although there are also many examples of our failure to pitch in,
automobile use is a particularly good one. Consider attitudes of residents
of the United States with respect to bearing a share of the costs of
reducing fossil fuel usage in automobiles. Poll data suggest persistent
opposition to increases in gas taxes. 29 The current view of the Secretary
24. Op-Ed., Overduefor Diet; Our Position:Ever-ExpandingHandoutsfor Big Sugar Can't

Be Justified, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 2, 2008, at A20.
25. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 308
(2002).
26. See, e.g., City of South Lake Tahoe, http://www.cityofslt.us/index.html (last visited Oct.
14, 2009).
NEW

27. TOM BAXTER ET AL., DARK HORIZONS: 10 NATIONAL PARKS MOST THREATENED BY
COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS 27 (Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n eds., 2008),

http://www.npca.org/darkhorizons/pdf/DarkHorizons Report.pdf (highlighting the effect that the
Intermountain Power Plant would have on visibility and air quality in Zion National Park and the
surrounding area); Project No Project: Intermountain Power Plant (IPP), Delta, UT,
http://pnp.uschamber.com/2009/03/intermountain-power-plant-ipp-delta-ut.html#more (last visited
Oct. 14, 2009) ("The City of Las [sic] Angeles takes roughly 45 percent of the power that is
produced.").
28. See Bernadette Del Chiaro, Los Angeles Mayor Stops New Coal Plant:
EnvironmentalistsPraise Hahn 's Orders to Immediately End City's Investment in the Intermountain

Power Plant Expansion, ENv'T CAL., Aug. 24, 2004, http://www.environmentcalifomia.org/
envirocalifenergy.asp?id2=14321; Grand Canyon Trust, Air Quality and Clean Energy Program,
http://www.grandcanyontrust.org/programs/air/coal-fired.php (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
29. See, e.g., Dennis Jacobe, Majority of Americans Favor Suspending Federal Gas Tax:
Lower- and Middle-Income Americans Join Republicans in Favor of Gas-Tax Holiday, GALLUP,
May 13, 2008, http://www.gallup.com/poll/107257/majority-americans-favor-suspending-federalgas-tax.aspx; 81% Oppose Gas Tax Hike to Encourage Sales of More Efficient Cars, RASMUSSEN
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of Energy in the Obama administration, Steven Chu, is that increasing
the gas tax as a way to lower consumption is "not politically feasible. 30
Americans consume 8,989,000 barrels (378 million gallons) of motor
fuel per day, 31 and account for twenty-five percent of world energy use
overall. 32 In 2006, there were approximately 135 million registered
automobiles in the United States-nearly half a car per person.33 At least
one attitude survey suggests that people in the United States (along with
people in China) are less concerned about global climate change than
Europeans.34 Americans show limited interest in shifting their
approximately 12,000 miles of driving per passenger vehicle per year to
smaller cars or to public transit, except when there are impressive
increases in gas prices.35
III. STRUCTURING RECIPROCITY

These are clear failures to meet reciprocity guidelines among
people in the United States.3 6 Indeed, all too often individual responses
to the problem of global climate change seem to be either a combination
of bewilderment and discouragement (what can I do, really? Will my

REP.,
May
11,
2009, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/business/gasoil!
81_opposegas_ tax hike to encourage_sales of moreefficientcars [hereinafter 81% Oppose
Gas Tax Hike]. There have been some encouraging signs, however. For example, amidst a set of
questions giving very negative answers to proposals to increase the gas tax, a majority said they
would be willing to support a tax increase if the revenue were specifically earmarked for action to
reduce global warming. Louis Uchitelle & Megan Thee, Americans Are Cautiously Open to Gas
Tax Rise, Poll Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,2006, at A 14.
30. Carola Hoyos et al., Rise in Taxes on US Petrol 'Not Feasible':Energy SecretaryAlters
Stance on FuelPolicy, FIN. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at 1.
31. Energy Info. Admin.,
Petroleum Basic Statistics, http://www.eia.doe.gov/
basics/quickoil.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
32. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Reducing U.S. Oil Dependence: A Real Energy Security Policy,
http://www.nrdc.org/air/energy/fensec.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
33. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., HIGHWAY STATISTICS 2006: STATE
MOTOR-VEHICLE REGISTRATIONS tbl.MV-1 (2007), available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/

policy/ohim/hs06/pdf/mvl .pdf.
34. PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, PARTISANSHIP DRIVES OPINION:

LITTLE CONSENSUS ON GLOBAL WARMING 1 (2006), http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/280.pdf
[hereinafter PEW RESEARCH CTR.].
35. The 12,000 miles of driving per vehicle figure is from the U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY,
EMISSION FACTS: GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM A TYPICAL PASSENGER VEHICLE 4 (2005),

http://www.epa.gov/OMS/climate/420f05004.pdf. For data on increases in public transit ridership,
see Press Release, Am. Pub. Transp. Ass'n, 10.7 Billion Trips Taken on U.S. Public Transportation
in 2008: Highest Level in 52 Years; Ridership Increased as Gas Prices Decline and Jobs Were Lost
(Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.apta.com/mediacenter/pressreleases/2009/Pages/090309 ridership.aspx.
36. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 34, at3-4.
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efforts make a difference?) or whining (don't raise my gas tax-I'm
already paying too much in taxes). Rising gas costs-and the attendant
shift in interest to more gas-efficient vehicles-were not met with
serious efforts to consider individual actions of the un-golden rule or the
pitch-in sort. 7 This may be, of course, because we are a country of
selfish people who took Thrasymachus as a role model from their
introductory philosophy courses.38 But it may also be because there are
structural features of American society that make it hard to confront and
think about how we are acting without the virtue of reciprocity on a
grand scale, and hard to figure out how to improve even if we would like
to. 39 In light of these structural features of U.S. society, U.S. failures to
behave with the virtue of reciprocity should not be surprising.
Probably the largest two aspects of individual energy use are where
and in what people live and what and how much people drive. About
where we live: We have a tax code that favors large, single-family
homes and school systems that flourish in areas where these homes are
located but far less so in areas of older or denser housing. 40 The home
mortgage deduction (available up to one million dollars on first and
second homes, but not on the third or fourth) is an enormous tax subsidy
that encourages profligate energy use in housing. 41 To be sure, there are
energy tax credits for such things as biomass stoves, solar panels (up to
$2000) and wind power installations (up to $4000).42 Many of these,
however, are largely boutique items: For example, one widely advertised
system for home wind power for utility bill reduction is priced at
$43,645 and recommended for land sizes of over an acre. 43 There are no
37. See 81% Oppose Gas Tax Hike, supranote 29.

38. PLATO, REPUBLIC 15 (C.D.C. Reeve trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 2004) (1930); see also
STANLEY ROSEN, PLATO'S REPUBLIC: A STUDY 43 (2005) ("According to Thrasymachus, justice is

the interest of the stronger.").
39. See, e.g., Francis, supra note 17, at 117-20; see also Quong, supra note 8, at 83 ("[T]he
distinction between the basic structure of society and the personal choices that people make within
that basic structure is arbitrary and permissive of injustice.").
40. See Posting of Edward L. Glaeser to Economix, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/
2009/02/24/killing-or-maiming-a-sacred-cow-home-mortgage-deductions/ (Feb. 24, 2009, 07:40
EST); see also Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law,

90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 20-22 (1990).
41. This point is surfacing in the current policy debates. See, e.g., Posting of Edward L.
Glaeser to Economix, supra note 40.
42. I.R.S., Residential Energy Efficient Property Credit (Form 5695), at 3 (2008), available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f5695.pdf.

43. Bergey Wind Energy, http://www.bergey.com/ (follow "Value Packages" hyperlink
under "Site Directory"; then follow "10 kW GridTek System" hyperlink under "Utility Bill
Reduction") (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
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tax credits for homes that are not single-family or for homes that are
located in areas of density rather than sprawl." The tax credit of $8000
for first-time home buyers extends to investments in energy efficient
devices-but does not take into account such energy-important factors
as overall square footage.45
Or consider transportation policy. The current federal tax per gallon
of gasoline is 18.4 cents, an amount that has not been raised since
1993.46 Increases in tolls have been equally difficult to implement-and
the federal interstate highway system remains free to users despite pilot
projects to generate toll revenues. 47 By contrast, a report issued in
February 2009 by the National Surface Transportation Infrastructure
Financing Commission recommended that the funding and financing
structure should ensure that users of the surface transportation system
bear the full costs of their use-which they fall far short of doing
today. 48 The Report recommended an ultimate shift to a miles-driven
basis for assessing user fees phased in until 2020, with a small increase
in the gas tax in the interim.49 The focus of the Report was surface
transit, not mass transit, moreover; and the report did not tackle the
question of how to fund a far more robust public transit system. 50 To
give one illustration of comparative funding for highways and public
transit, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act authorized only
$8.4 billion in capital funds for public transit improvements, 51 but $26.8
billion for highway construction; 52 $19.2 billion of these highway funds
have already been allocated.5 3

44. I.R.S., supranote 42, at 3.
45. Id.
46. Christopher Conkey, Raising the Federal Gas Tax is a No-Go, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4,

2009, at A2.
47. Id.
48. NAT'L SURFACE TRANSP. INFRASTRUCTURE FIN. COMM'N, PAYING OUR WAY: A NEW
FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSPORTATION FINANCE 27-28 (2009), available at http://finance
commission.dot.gov/Documents/NSTIF-Commission-Final-Report-Advance%2OCopy-FebO9.pdf.
49. Id. at 193-94.
50. Id. at 5.

51. Fed. Transit Admin., American Recovery & Reinvestment Act (ARRA),
http://www.fta.dot.gov/index_9440.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
52. Fed. Highway Admin., The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA),
http://www.fwa.dot.gov/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
53. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Behaving virtuously is not easy and can be lonely. Dispositions to
be virtuous can be undermined by the observation that others are not
being virtuous as well. When multiple actors are needed to make a real
difference, even those who wish to be virtuous can be discouraged, as
they see their own good efforts achieve little if anything. Changes in
structural features of U.S. society-how we design our homes and
communities-and how we use the law to create incentives for design
systems can make enormous differences in this regard. Yet despite the
present hopes of realignment during the economic downturn, we seem to
be making only limited efforts to create structures to encourage people
to engage in virtuous behavior with respect to climate change. As a
result, Americans seem all too likely not to follow the un-golden rule,
continuing to undermine good efforts of others. And our failures to pitch
in will not be attributable just to selfishness or enjoyment of liberty, but
to very real limits on the choices we have.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 6

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol37/iss4/6

10

